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In experimental psychology different experiments have been developed to assess
goal–directed as compared to habitual control over instrumental decisions. Similar
to animal studies selective devaluation procedures have been used. More recently
sequential decision-making tasks have been designed to assess the degree of
goal-directed vs. habitual choice behavior in terms of an influential computational theory of
model-based compared to model-free behavioral control. As recently suggested, different
measurements are thought to reflect the same construct. Yet, there has been no attempt
to directly assess the construct validity of these different measurements. In the present
study, we used a devaluation paradigm and a sequential decision-making task to address
this question of construct validity in a sample of 18 healthy male human participants.
Correlational analysis revealed a positive association between model-based choices during
sequential decisions and goal-directed behavior after devaluation suggesting a single
framework underlying both operationalizations and speaking in favor of construct validity
of both measurement approaches. Up to now, this has been merely assumed but never
been directly tested in humans.
Keywords: model-based and model-free learning, habitual and goal-directed behavior, 2-step decision task,
devaluation task, reinforcement learning, computational modeling
INTRODUCTION
Habitual decisions arise from the retrospective, slow accumula-
tion of rewards via iterative updating of expectations. In contrast,
the goal-directed system prospectively considers future outcomes
associated with an action. Thus, if outcome values change sud-
denly e.g., after devaluation (i.e., satiety), the goal-directed system
enables quick behavioral adaptation, whereas the habitual sys-
tem requires new reward experience before it can alter behavior
accordingly (Balleine and Dickinson, 1998). Recently, this dual
system theory has been advanced by the use of computational
models of learning which either purely update reward expecta-
tions based on reward prediction errors (“model-free”) or aim
to map possible actions to their potential outcomes (“model-
based”; Daw et al., 2005). In their comprehensive review Dolan
andDayan (2013) subsume both concepts (goal-directed/habitual
andmodel-based/model-free) under a single framework of reflec-
tive vs. reflexive decision making. Here, model-based choices
are by definition goal-directed and model-free choices rest upon
habitual learning. The authors provide a historical and concep-
tual framework for the evolution of dual systems theories with a
reflexive and a reflective control system in cognitive neuroscience.
This longstanding dichotomy has been described as goal-directed
vs. habitual behavior by experimental psychologists while the
model-free vs. model-based theory provides a computational
account of the same construct.
Dolan and Dayan (2013) rank goal-directed behavior in
humans in Generation 2, evolving from animal experiments in
Generation 1. Generation 3 starts with the conceptual precision
of goal-directed and habitual decision making as model-based vs.
model-free learning on the basis of computational accounts in a
reinforcement learning context. Even though both terminologies,
goal-directed and model-based behavioral control, derive from
the same framework, the different operationalizations have never
been directly related in a human sample.
There are two main, but experimentally distinct, approaches
to test the influence of both systems: outcome devaluation and
sequential decision-making. First, devaluation paradigms require
participants to overcome a previously trained action after out-
come devaluation. Here, the goal-directed system adapts quickly
based on an explicit action-outcome association. This is in
sharp contrast to the habitual system that remains initially tied
to the action acquired before devaluation because it relies on
a stimulus-action association without direct representation of
the link between action and a now devalued outcome. These
paradigms have been developed in animal research (Dickinson,
1985) and were successfully translated to human research in
healthy (Valentin et al., 2007; De Wit et al., 2009; Tricomi et al.,
2009) and pathological conditions (De Wit et al., 2011; Gillan
et al., 2011; Sjoerds et al., 2013). Second, sequential decision-
making challenges an individual with a series of subsequent
decisions to finally receive a reward (Generation 3). These tasks
are characterized by a state-transition structure, which probabilis-
tically determines the entered state after a given choice. Hence,
a learner that acquires and uses this task structure (e.g., using a
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decision tree) by building and using an internal representation
(a “model”) of the task is therefore labeled as “model-based.”
This learner builds an internal representation of the task struc-
ture, which enables forward planning. Apparently, model-based
learning is by definition goal-directed. A purely “model-free”
learner neglects these transition schemes and simply repeats
action sequences that were previously rewarded. Such tasks have
been applied in healthy participants (Daw et al., 2011;Wunderlich
et al., 2012; Smittenaar et al., 2013) and in one study in alcohol-
dependent patients (Sebold et al., 2014). For both types of tasks,
there is convincing evidence that human choices are influenced
by both systems.
It is an on-going question whether these different measure-
ments assess the same aspects of instrumental behavior (Doll
et al., 2012; Dolan and Dayan, 2013). We assume that both mea-
surements reflect the same construct and therefore shed light on
similar mechanism from the perspectives of different experimen-
tal procedures that evolved from different fields (experimental
psychology and computational theory). So far, this issue of con-
struct validity has not been directly tested. However, the question
of construct validity is important to address: in neuroscience
research the two measurements have so far been treated almost
equivalently and conclusions on presumably identical processes
have been drawn in healthy human beings and also in severely
ill individuals. Relating both measurements thus represents a
coercive step to add to their conceptual precision.
To assess construct validity, we applied two tasks: a selec-
tive devaluation task (Valentin et al., 2007; Daw et al., 2011)
and a sequential decision-making task (Daw et al., 2011) proven
to capture the two constructs of goal-directed vs. habitual and
model-based vs. model-free behavioral control separately using
a within-subject design in 18 healthy male participants.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
SUBJECTS
Eighteen right-handed healthy male subjects participated in the
study. All participants were assessed for Axis I or II disorder with
SCID-I Interview as well as for eating disorders with the Eating
Attitude Test (EAT-26) (Garner et al., 1982) indicating no psychi-
atric or eating disorder in any of the subjects. Participants were
pre-screened to ensure that they found tomato juice, chocolate
milk and fruit tea pleasant and did not show any food intolerance
or were not on a diet. All participants were asked to fast for at
least 6 h before their scheduled arrival time, but were permitted
and motivated to drink water before the experimental proce-
dure. Upon arrival, participants rated their hunger on a visual
analog scale (VAS) and informed the instructor when they had
last eaten. There were no objective measures to control if par-
ticipants complied with the instruction to fast. All participants
gave informed written consent and the study was approved by the
Ethics Committee of the Charité Universitätsmedizin.
TASKS
Devaluation paradigm
To test goal-directed vs. habitual behavior, we used a selective
devaluation paradigm with liquid food rewards (Figures 1A,B;
Valentin et al., 2007). The two liquid food rewards were chocolate
milk and tomato juice. These foods were chosen because they can
be administered in liquid form, are palatable at room temperature
and are distinguishable in their flavor and texture to help facilitate
sensory specific satiety effects. In addition we also used a tasteless
neutral water solution and fruit tea as control. The food rewards
were delivered by means of separate electronic syringe pumps
(one for each liquid) positioned behind a small room divider
(paravent). These pumps transferred the liquids to the subjects via
plastic tubes (∼6mm diameter). The end of these tubes were held
between the subject’s lips like a straw and attached to the shoulder
with a small adhesive tape while they were sitting in front of the
computer screen performing the task.
The task consisted of three trial types: chocolate, tomato or
neutral, with fully randomized order throughout the experiment
(Figure 1A). On each trial, subjects were faced with the choice
between two abstract stimuli, each of which was associated with
different probabilities to receive a rewarding liquid food outcome
or nothing.
The experimental procedure (Figures 1A,B) was divided into
three steps: (1) training, (2) devaluation, and (3) test in extinc-
tion. First, during the training part, subjects learned to make
choices that were associated with the subsequent delivery of these
different liquid food outcomes (0.5ml of tomato juice or choco-
late milk and fruit tea). For each trial type, the overall probability
of a food outcome was p = 0.75 for the high-probability stimulus
(referring to the choice of the stimulus associated with a high-
probability food outcome) with p = 0.5 for tomato or chocolate
and p = 0.25 for the common outcome fruit tea. The low prob-
ability stimulus (meaning the choice of the stimulus associated
with a low probability liquid food outcome) led with p = 0.25 to
a common outcome (0.5ml fruit tea). In the control condition,
water was delivered with the same probabilities of p = 0.75 after
a high probability stimulus choice and p = 0.25 after a low proba-
bility stimulus choice, respectively. The training sessions consisted
of 150 trials (50 trials for each stimulus pair). To facilitate learn-
ing of the stimulus-outcome associations between the abstract
stimuli and the liquid food rewards, each stimulus-outcome pair
(chocolate, tomato, and neutral) was randomly assigned to one
of the four spatial positions on the screen (top left, top right,
bottom left, or bottom right) at the beginning of the experiment
and remained constant throughout. A unique spatial location was
assigned to the high-probability stimulus in all three trial-type
pairs. The specific assignment of arbitrary fractal stimuli and spa-
tial position to each particular action was fully counterbalanced
across subjects. The subjects’ task on each trial throughout all
parts of the experimental procedure was to choose one of the
two possible available stimuli on the screen which they perceived
as being “more pleasant” (and thus is associated with a higher
probability to receive a rewarding outcome). In a second step, dur-
ing the devaluation part and after training, either tomato juice
or chocolate milk was selectively devalued by feeding the sub-
ject with the food until they reported a feeling of satiety. For
devaluation, participants ate either chocolate pudding or tomato
soup (mean consumption in grams = 357.1, std. = 196.0) until
they rated the devalued food as unpleasant and refused to con-
sume more. Third, during test in extinction and after devaluation,
participants continued with the instrumental choice paradigm in
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FIGURE 1 | Selective devaluation paradigm according to Valentin et al.
(2007). (A) Trial structure depicted for each condition during instrumental
learning. On each trial subjects had to choose between two abstract stimuli,
the chosen stimulus is then highlighted. The high-probability stimulus choice
leads to a food outcome (chocolate or tomato) with a probability of p = 0.5
and to a common outcome (fruit tea) with p = 0.25. The low-probability
stimulus choice never leads to food outcomes and in p = 0.25 to the
common outcome. In the neutral condition, the high-probability stimulus
choice leads to water with p = 0.75 and the low-probability stimulus choice
to water with p = 0.25. (B) After instrumental training, subjects were invited
to consume either chocolate (illustrated here) or tomato soup to satiety,
resulting in a selective devaluation of the consumed outcome. Subjects then
underwent the same “test” procedure in extinction (chocolate and tomato
were no longer presented).
extinction without delivery of the liquid food rewards tomato or
chocolate (150 trials without food delivery, 50 trials for each stim-
ulus pair). To maintain some degree of responding, the neutral
fruit tea outcome continued to be available as during training
with equal probability for the two available actions of p = 0.3
each (similar to Valentin et al., 2007). Subjects rated pleasant-
ness of all administered foods on a visual analogous scale (VAS)
before training, after training, after devaluation and after extinc-
tion. The use of an extinction procedure ensured that subjects
only use information about the value of the outcome by making
use of the previously learned associations between that outcome
and a particular choice, as otherwise, if the tomato and choco-
late outcome were presented again at test, subjects could relearn
a new association, thereby confounding stimulus-response and
response-outcome contributions. As reported by Valentin et al.
(2007), goal-directed behavior is characterized by a significant
decrease in choices of the stimulus associated with the devalued
outcome, whereas habitual behavior leads to continued choosing
of the stimulus associated with the devalued outcome. The num-
ber of choices was analyzed using a 2 (time: pre/post) × 2 (value:
devalued/valued) repeated measures ANOVA to assess the degree
of goal-directed vs. habitual choices.
For the devaluation paradigm, four participants had to be
excluded from the sample (2 did not reach the learning criterion
of 75% correct choices during training session and 2 refused to
eat more although they did not rate the devalued food as being
less pleasant after consumption and thus did not reach satiety).
Sequential decision-making task
In the sequential decision-making task (Daw et al., 2011), par-
ticipants had to make two subsequent choices (each out of two
options) to finally receive a monetary reward. At the first stage,
each choice option led commonly (with 70% probability) to one
of two pairs of stimuli and rarely (with 30% probability) to
the other one. After entering the second stage, a second choice
was followed by monetary reward or not, which was delivered
according to slowly changing Gaussian random walks to facili-
tate the continuous updating of the second-stage action values.
Participants performed a total of 201 trials. Crucially, a purely
model-based learner uses the probabilities that underlie the tran-
sition from the first to the second stage, while a purely model-free
learner neglects this task structure (Figure 2). Depending on
the impact of previous second-stage rewards on the following
first-stage choices, reinforcement learning theory predicts dis-
tinct first-stage choice patterns for model-free as opposed to
model-based strategies. Model-free behavior can only generate
a main effect of reward: a rewarded choice is more likely to be
repeated, regardless of whether the reward followed a common
or rare transition. Model-based behavior results in an interac-
tion of the two factors, because a rare transition inverts the effect
of the subsequent reward. Stay-switch behavior was analyzed
as a function of reward (reward/no reward) and state (com-
mon/rare). These individual stay probabilities were subjected
to a repeated-measures ANOVA with the factors reward and
state.
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FIGURE 2 | Sequential Decision-Making Task (Two-Step), according to
Daw et al. (2011). (A) Trial configuration for the Experiment. Each trial
consisted of two different stages, and each stage involved a choice between
two stimuli. In the first stage, subjects chose between two abstract stimuli
on a gray background. The chosen stimulus was highlighted by a red frame
and moved to the top of the screen, where it remained visible for 1.5 s; at the
same time, the other stimulus faded away. Subjects then reached a
subsequent second stage. Here subjects saw one of two further pairs of
colored stimuli and again chose between these. The monetary outcome
following this second stage choice (gain or no gain of 20 cent) was then
presented centrally on the screen. (B) One pair of colored second stage
stimuli occurred commonly (on 70% of trials; “common trials”) after choice
of one first stage stimulus, while the other pair was associated equally
strongly with the other stimulus. On the remaining 30% of trials, the chosen
first stage option resulted in a transition to the other second stage stimulus
pair (“rare trials”). Reinforcement probabilities for each second stage
stimulus changed slowly and independently according to Gaussian random
walks with reflecting boundaries at 0.25 and 0.75.
With respect to the sequential decision-making task, one par-
ticipant was excluded due to abortion of the experiment after half
of the trials.
COMPUTATIONAL MODELING OF THE SEQUENTIAL DECISION-MAKING
TASK
The aim of model-free and model-based algorithms is to learn
values for each of the stimuli, which appear in the task as three
pairs (sA, sB, sC).sA refers to the first-stage stimuli and sB and sC to
the two pairs of second-stage stimuli. Here, a refers to the chosen
stimuli and the indices i and t denote the stage (i = 1 for SA at the
first stage and i = 2 for SB or SC at the second stage) and the trial,
respectively. The model-free algorithm was SARSA(λ):
QMFsi,t + 1,ai,t + 1 = QMFsi,t ,ai,t + αiδi,t (1)
δi,t = ri,t + QMFsi+ 1,t ,ai+ 1,t − QMFsi,t ,ai,t (2)
Notably, r(s1,t) = 0 because there are no rewards available at the
first stage and Q(s3,t,at) = 0 at the second stage because there are
only two-stages and no third stage in this version of a sequen-
tial decision making task. All Q-values were initialized (“starting
parameter”) with 0. We allow different learning rates αi for each
stage i. Further, we allow for an additional stage-skipping update
of first-stage values by introducing another parameter λ, which
connects the two stages and allows the reward prediction error at
the second stage to influence first-stage values:
QMFs1,t + 1,a1,t + 1 = QMFs1,t ,a1,t + α1λδ2,t (3)
It is worth mentioning that λ additionally accounts for the main
effect of reward as observed in the analysis of first-stage stay-
switch behavior but not for an interaction of reward and state.
Instead, the introduction of the transition matrix accounts for
this interaction. Here, the model-based algorithm learns values
by taking into account the transition matrix and computes first-
stage values by simply multiplying the better option at the second
stage with the transition probabilities:
QMBsA,a = P(SB|SA, a) × maxQMFsB,a + P(Sc|SA, a)
× maxQMFsC,a (4)
QMBs2,t ,a2,t = QMFs2,t ,a2,t (5)
Note that this approach simplifies transition learning because
transition probabilities are not learned explicitly. This approach
is in line with the task instructions, and a simulation by Daw
et al. (2011) verified that this approach outperforms incremen-
tal learning of the transition matrix (compare Wunderlich et al.,
2012 but also see Glascher et al., 2010 or Lee et al., 2014). Finally,
we connect QMF and QMB in a hybrid algorithm:
QsA,a = ω × QMBsA,a + (1 − ω) × QMFsA,a (6)
Qs2,a = QMBs2,a = QMFs2,a (7)
Importantly, ω gives a weighting of the relative influence of
model-free and model-based values and is therefore the model’s
parameter of most interest. To generate choices, we apply a
softmax for Q:
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p(i, a, t) =
exp (βi(Qsi,t,a′i,t
+ ρ × rep(a)))
∑
a′ exp (βi(Qsi,t ,a′i,t + ρ × rep(a′)))
(8)
Here, β controls the stochasticity of the choices and we assume
this to be different between the two stages. The additional param-
eter ρ captures first-stage choice perseveration and rep is an
indicator function that equals 1 if the previous first-stage choice
was the same (Lau and Glimcher, 2005; Daw et al., 2011). In
summary, the algorithm has a total of 7 parameters and can be
reduced to its special cases ω = 1 (4 parameters) and ω = 0 (5
parameters). We fit bounded parameters by transforming them
to a logistic (α, λ, ω) or exponential (β) distribution to render
normally distributed parameter estimates. To infer the maximum
a posteriori estimate of each parameter for each subject, we set
the prior distribution to the maximum-likelihood given the data
of all participants and then use Expectation-Maximization. For
an in-depth description please compare Huys et al. (2011) and
Huys et al. (2012). In the computational modeling part there were
no differences to Daw et al. (2011) with respect to the applied
model-free and model-based algorithms as well as the softmax
function.
CORRELATION ANALYSIS OF GOAL-DIRECTED AND MODEL-BASED
BEHAVIOR
We assessed the degree of goal-directed behavior in the selec-
tive devaluation task by computing the interaction score from
the number of choices: “(valued stimulus pre devaluation – val-
ued stimulus post devaluation) – (devalued stimulus pre devalua-
tion - devalued stimulus post devaluation).” Here, a higher score
indicates more goal-directed behavior, i.e., participants more fre-
quently preferred the valued over the devalued stimulus after
devaluation. Model-based behavior in the sequential decision-
making task was assessed with a similar interaction score of stay
probabilities at the first stage: “(rewarded common stimulus choice
– rewarded rare stimulus choice) – (unrewarded common stimulus
choice - unrewarded rares stimulus choice).” This indicates more
model-based behavior when participants more frequently stayed
after having received rewards in common states and no-rewards
in rare states. Further, we also use the parameter ω derived from
computational modeling which balances the influences of model-
free andmodel-based decision values. Based on a directed a priori
hypothesis of a positive association between the main outcome
measures of the two paradigms, we report one-tailed p-values.
Due to the relatively small sample size, we apply the more con-
servative Spearman correlation coefficient, which is more robust
against outliers.
RESULTS
DEVALUATION PARADIGM
Training
Over the course of training, participants (n = 14) chose the
high-probability stimulus (delivering the rewarding food with a
higher probability) significantly more often compared to the low
probability stimulus (Figure 3). This was the case for all stimuli
associated with the high-probability outcome in the last 10 trials
FIGURE 3 | Subjects learn to choose the high probability stimulus in all
three conditions (devalued: T = −3.50, p = 0.004, valued: T = −2.60,
p = 0.022; and neutral: T = −2.73, p = 0.017), with a significant
decrease of instrumental choice after devaluation only for the
devalued stimulus (T = 3.15, p = 0.008).
of the training session [the devalued (T = −3.50, p = 0.004),
valued (T = −2.60, p = 0.022), and neutral (T = −2.73, p =
0.017) condition].
Outcome devaluation
After devaluation, participants rated the devalued food (choco-
late or tomato) significantly less pleasant compared to the
valued and neutral condition (Figure 4, T = 2.67, p = 0.019).
Further, they reported significantly less hunger after the deval-
uation procedure (Figure 4, T = 2.25, p = 0.042). These results
clearly indicate that the devaluation exerted its expected effect
selectively for the devalued but not for the valued out-
come.
Test phase in extinction
Assessing choice behavior after the devaluation procedure dur-
ing the test phase in extinction, a significant time (pre/post
training) × condition (devalued/valued/neutral) interaction was
found (F = 5.200, p = 0.040, see Figure 5). This was due to a
significant decrease in choice of the high-probability stimulus
associated with the devalued compared to the stimulus associ-
ated with the valued and neutral outcome in the first 10 trials
of the test session compared to the last 10 trials of the train-
ing session (T = 3.15, p = 0.008). Thus, participants were able
to adapt their choices of stimuli as a function of the associated
outcome value, providing direct behavioral evidence for goal-
directed behavior as has been previously reported by Valentin
et al. (2007).
SEQUENTIAL DECISION-MAKING TASK (TWO-STEP)
In line with previous studies (Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al.,
2012; Smittenaar et al., 2013), stay-switch behavior at the first
stage revealed a significant main effect of reward (F = 14.1, p =
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0.002) and a significant reward × state interaction (F = 6.05,
p = 0.026, see Figure 5). This clearly shows that both rewards
and state transitions influenced the participants’ choices. Thus,
a mixture of model-free and model-based strategies was observed
and this was further quantified using a computational model that
weights the influence of both strategies. Distribution of random-
effects parameters from computational modeling is displayed in
Table 1.
FIGURE 4 | Subjective pleasantness ratings for the devalued
(chocolate or tomato), the neutral (water), and the common (fruit
tea) outcome at 4 time points throughout the experimental
procedure. After devaluation, participants rated the devalued food
(chocolate or tomato) significantly (as indicated by ∗) less pleasant
compared to the valued and neutral condition (T = 2.67, p = 0.019).
Further, they reported significantly less hunger after the devaluation
procedure (panels display subjective hunger ratings at the 4 time points,
T = 2.25, p = 0.042).
CONSTRUCT VALIDITY: CORRELATION BETWEEN BOTH
MEASUREMENTS
Thirteen subjects were included in the final analysis of both
tasks (mean age in years = 46, std = 9). The interaction score
derived from the outcome devaluation task correlated signifi-
cantly with the interaction score derived from the sequential
decision-making task (Spearman’s rho = 0.708, p < 0.005, one
tailed) and also with the parameter ω derived from computa-
tional modeling (Spearman’s rho = 0.498, p < 0.05, one tailed).
When removing one outlier for the model-based score (3SD >
mean), the correlation still remained significant in 12 participants
(Figure 6).
Interestingly, the interaction term from the selective devalu-
ation task did not correlate with the main effect of reward or
with the parameter λ (scaling the influence of reward prediction
errors on first-stage decision values) derived from computational
modeling (p > 0.75).
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we used two reinforcement learning tasks
in the same participants, selective devaluation and sequential
decision-making, which are frequently used in human research.
Table 1 | Best-fitting parameter estimates shown as median plus
quartiles across subjects.
β1 β2 α1 α2 λ ω p
25th percentile 4.57 1.53 0.28 0.40 0.44 0.34 0.15
median 6.55 2.42 0.56 0.58 0.70 0.43 0.20
75th percentile 7.55 4.35 0.76 0.69 0.85 0.54 0.26
β, stochasticity of the choices for the first (β1) and second (β2) stage; α, learning
rate for first (α1) and second (α 2) stage; λ, reinforcement eligibility parameter
(estimated value of the second stage should act as the same sort of model-
free reinforcer for the first stage choice); ω, relative influence of model-free and
model-based values; p, first-stage choice perseveration.
FIGURE 5 | Analysis of choice behavior. (A) Devaluation task: subjects show
significantly more valued compared to devalued stimulus choices after
devaluation in extinction (n = 14, F = 5.20, p = 0.040, error bars indicate
s.e.m.), reflecting “goal-directed” behavior. (B) Sequential choice task: the
same subjects show higher stay probabilities in the “rewarded common” as
opposed to the “unrewarded common” trials (main effect reward: (n = 17,
F = 14.1, p = 0.002), reflecting “model-based” behavior with a positive
reward × frequency interaction over all subjects (n = 17, F = 6.05, p = 0.026).
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FIGURE 6 | Correlation of “model-based” [sequential decision-making
(2-step) interaction term] and “goal-directed” (devaluation paradigm
interaction term) behavior (n = 12, Spearman R = 0.74, p = 0.003).
Here, we aim to assess the construct validity of these twomeasure-
ments which have both been suggested to capture the dichotomy
of goal-directed or model-based vs. habitual or model-free con-
trol, respectively. In the selective devaluation task, we found evi-
dence of goal-directed choices as subjects decreased their choice
for a stimulus associated with a now devalued outcome. In the
sequential decision-making task, subjects displayed model-based
behavior, which is by definition goal-directed, indicating that par-
ticipants used the transition structure to solve the task as it is
indicated by the significant reward by state interaction and by the
weighting parameter ω derived from computational modeling.
As comprehensively reviewed by Dolan and Dayan (2013)
those two different operationalizations in part stem from different
methodological and historical perspectives. Both selective devalu-
ation and sequential decision-making have been used to describe
similar behavioral patterns but they have never been directly
related to one another in a sample of human subjects. Here we
found, that measures of the individual degree of goal-directed
behavior assessed with selective devaluation and model-based
behavior assessed during sequential decision-making indeed cor-
relate positively. This provides evidence for the construct validity
of bothmeasurements indicating that theymeasure the same con-
cept grounded in a single common framework as suggested by
Dolan and Dayan (2013).
Here, we suggest that goal-directed behavior as measured dur-
ing selective devaluation reflects one of the many facets of model-
based learning which is also applicable to several other tasks, in
particular instrumental reversal learning (Hampton et al., 2006;
Li and Daw, 2011; Schlagenhauf et al., 2014) but also Pavlovian
conditioning (Huys et al., 2012; Prevost et al., 2013). This may
suggest that the individual balance between the two different
modes of control over instrumental choices may be relevant
for a variety of tasks and reflect enduring interindividual dif-
ferences that are consistent across tasks. Although this balance
between goal-directed and habitual control has been considered
as interindividual trait (Doll et al., 2012; Dolan and Dayan, 2013)
we have to caution that the temporal stability of these measures
has not been shown—as it has been the case e.g., for cognitive
functions like working memory (Klein and Fiss, 1999; Waters and
Caplan, 2003).
Another related question—not addressed here—concerns the
notion by Daw et al. (2005) that model-free and model-based
learning strategies compete with each other based on the relative
certainty of their estimates (Daw et al., 2005). From this theoreti-
cal perspective, themodel-based system is computationally costly:
When individuals face a decision problem, the costs of opportuni-
ties of the model-based system need to rule out the benefits of the
simple model-free system to govern control over a decision (also
compare Niv et al., 2007). In other words, use of the model-based
system should be beneficial compared to the model-free system.
Lee et al. (2014) suggested that an arbitrator keeps track of the
degree of reliability of the two systems and uses this information
in order to proportionately allocate behavior control depending
on task demands.
The sequential decision-making task used in the present study
gives an individual degree of both model-free and model-based
behavior. We observed that the degree of goal-directed behavior
in the devaluation task was not related to measurements repre-
senting the degree of the model-free behavior during sequential
decisions (as indicated by the main effect of reward or a high
reinforcement eligibility parameter derived from computational
modeling). This indicates the specificity of the correlation of goal-
directed choices measured with the devaluation procedure and
the degree of model-based behavior measured with the sequential
decision-making task. One might have expected that a continued
choice of the devalued option indicates habitual behavior which
is then represented in a small interaction term. A correlation
of the interaction term of the devaluation paradigm with mea-
sures of model-free behavior in the sequential decision-making
task would have indicated that habitual behavior can be induced
by the devaluation procedure. The absence of such an associa-
tion is in line with the findings from Valentin et al. (2007) that
on the neuronal level no activation of structures associated with
habitual behavior like e.g., the putamen was observed so that
the authors conclude that their selective devaluation paradigm
is indeed better suited to reflect goal-directed behavior whereas
habitual behavior might be observed in tasks using overtraining
(Tricomi et al., 2009). To this end, associations between the bal-
ance in between model-based and model-free control determined
in sequential decision-making should be related to behavioral
measures of habitual responding in overtraining paradigms. In
the sequential decision-making task used here the outcome prob-
abilities driving model-free behavior during sequential decision-
making were changing slowly (according to Gaussian random
walks) to facilitate continuous updating of decision values. This
was implemented to avoid amoment in time during the task when
a purely model-free strategy becomes clearly advantageous com-
pared to the more complex model-based strategy and might have
had an effect on the development of habit-like patterns.
Thus, it is important to note that both paradigms may
provide different insight into the habitual system, while goal-
directed/model-based measurements are more related (and can
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be better captured via the two experimental procedures). For
example in another variant of devaluation (De Wit et al., 2009)
alcohol-dependent patients indeed displayed an overreliance on
habits at the cost of goal-directed behavior (Sjoerds et al., 2013).
Using sequential decision-making in alcohol-dependent patients,
another study demonstrated that model-based behavior is com-
promised but no difference between patients and controls was
observed in terms of model-free behavior (Sebold et al., 2014).
While sequential decision-making enables researchers to disen-
tangle model-free and model-based contributions to decision-
making, it may obscure enhanced habit-like patterns. To this end,
paradigms are needed that are rigorously designed to capture the
appropriate predominance of one or the other mode of control
given a certain moment in time, also taking into account an arbi-
trator evaluating the performance of each of these systems (as
described by Lee et al., 2014).
Limitations of our study include a relatively small sample size,
thus both paradigms and the assessed measurements have been
previously validated separately in larger samples (Valentin et al.,
2007; Daw et al., 2011; Wunderlich et al., 2012). All results are
correlational, hence inferences about causality are very limited.
Nevertheless, the strong a priori hypothesis of one, single frame-
work supports the idea of construct validity as assessed by the
reported correlation.
Summing up, we suggest that the same construct of goal-
directed and model-based behavior is assessed via different
experimental procedures (devaluation and sequential decision-
making) that validly measure this construct. This is the first study
to directly compare these experiments in one sample of human
participants. In conclusion, our results support the longstanding
and pervasive idea of a common single framework. Therefore,
we provide evidence for the construct validity, which merits the
use of both experiments in assessing interindividual differences
in the predominant type of behavioral control over instrumental
choices.
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